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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and JESSE R. S. 
BUDGE, Commissioners of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah, and 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN 
EXPRESS CO. and CLARK TANK 
LINES COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9886 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an investigation by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah to determine why the rate published 
by Uintah Freightways for the transportation of crude 
oil, in bulk, between specific points within the Uintah 
Basin, Utah, should not be permanently suspended. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
On March 5, 1963, the Public Service Commission 
issued its order permanently suspending item No. 324-2 
of Second Revised Page 34-A, of Tariff 5-G, PSCU 
No. 5, filed October 25, 1962 by Uintah Freightways and 
directing Uintah Freightways to cease transportation 
of petroleum or petroleum products, in bulk, in tank 
vehicles, under or pursuant to said tariff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the order of 
the Public Service Commission dated March 5, 1963. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is filled with argument 
and conclusions . 
On October 25, 1962, the Intermountain Tariff 
Bureau, Inc. issued a Second Revised Page 34-A to be-
come effective on November 30, 1962 in Tariff No. 5-G, 
PSCU No.5. The effect of said publication was to desig-
nate a new item (324-2) naming a rate of 8¢ per barrel, 
per hour, for hauling crude oil, in bulk, between specific 
points in the Uintah Basin area. The publication was 
made for, and on behalf of, Uintah Freightways, appel-
lant herein. Respondents filed written objections asking 
that the tariff be suspended. The Commission refused 
respondents' request for temporary suspension and set the 
matter for hearing, which was held in Salt L(;lke City on 
December 18, 1962. 
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Pursuant to such hearing, the Commission, on March 
5, 1963, issued its report and order directing appellant 
to cease transportation of petroleum or petroleum pro-
ducts, in bulk, in tank vehicles, and suspended and can-
celled the above-mentioned tariff. The authority held by 
appellant under which it claims the right to transport 
petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, is contained 
in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1288 
issued to it on September 22, 1958. That certificate 
authorizes it to "operate as a common carrier of property 
handling both freight and express in intrastate com-
merce, . . . " between the points involved. 
It is this language upon which appellant bases its 
claimed right to transport petroleum and petroleum pro-
ducts, in bulk. 
The certificate under question is an outgrowth of a 
certificate originally issued to Sterling Transportation 
Company in 1926, Certificate No. 247. (R. 89) The 
language of the Commission's initial order dated October 
2, 1926, in Case No. 885, was as follows: 
"ORDERED FURTHER, That the Sterling 
Transportation Company be, and it is hereby, 
authorized to operate an automobile freight line 
(under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 274) between Vernal and Salt Lake City, 
Utah, via Duchesne, Utah, serving all points with-
in but not without the Uintah Basin; that is to say, 
that it shall not receive freight at Heber City, 
Utah, destined to Salt Lake City or intermediate 
points beyond Heber City, Utah, nor at Salt Lake 
City when destined to Heber City or to inter-
mediate points between Salt Lake City and Heber 
City, Utah." (R. 89) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
It should be noted that this original certificate con-
tained no commodity description whatever and merely 
authorized Sterling Transportation Company to operate 
an automobile freight line. Tariffs were filed pursuant 
to the certificate on August 11, 1926, and supplemental 
tariffs were filed on October 22 and October 23, 1926. 
Neither of these tariffs contained any published rate on 
bulk petroleum products. 
On August 26, 1938, in Case No. 2131, the Commis-
sion amended and clarified the above certificate No. 274 
held by Sterling Transportation Company in the follow-
ing language: 
"IT IS ORDERED, That Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity No. 274, granted to the 
Sterling Transportation Company, a corporation, 
by the Public Utilities Commission of the State 
of Utah, on October 2, 1926, be, and the same 
is hereby amended and clarified so as to authorize 
said Sterling Transportation Company, a corpora-
tion, to operate as a common motor carrier of 
property, handling both freight and express, be4 
tween Salt Lake City and all points within the 
Uintah Basin and east of Heber City, Utah, via 
either of the two following routes: " (R. 91) 
(Emphasis Added) 
On February 17, 1947, the Commission issued an 
order changing the corporate name of Sterling Trans-
portation Company to Uintah Freight Lines and con-
tinuing in effect Certificates of Convenience and Neces-
sity Nos. 274, as amended, and 503, as originally granted, 
under the name of Uintah Freight Lines. (R. 95) 
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On August 28, 1956, the Commission cancelled Cer-
tificates of Convenience and Necessity Nos. 274 and 503 
held by Uintah Freight Lines and issued a new Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1168 to Rings by Truck 
Lines, Inc. pursuant to a joint application of Uintah 
Freight Lines and Ringsby Truck Lines whereby the 
latter was to assume the operating rights held by the 
former. The language of the new certificate issued to 
Ringsby was essentially the same as that held by Uintah 
Freight Lines and is in substantially the same language 
as that presently held by appellant. The pertinent portion 
of the certificate, that is the commodity description, was, 
and is, identical with that issued in 1938 to Sterling 
Transportation Company in certificate No. 274, as 
amended. That language was, and is, "to operate as a 
common carrier of property, handling both freight and 
express." (R. 96-99) (Emphasis Added) 
On August 6, 1957, the Commission issued its report 
and order in Case No. 4325 - Sub 1 pursuant to the 
application of Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. granting ad-
ditional authority to Ringsby "authorizing it to operate 
as a common carrier by motor vehicle for the trans porta-
tion of commodities generally, excluding household goods, 
explosives, petroleum and petroleum products in bulk, 
and commodities which by reason of their size, shape, 
weight, origin or destination require special handling or 
special equipment, over irregular routes, on call, between 
all points in Utah which applicant is now authorized to 
serve under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 1168 on the one hand, and all points in Daggett 
County, Utah, on the other hand," (R. 104) (Emphasis 
Added) 
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In its Findings of Fact in this proceeding, the Com-
mission stated: 
"In addition to the services offered by protestants 
Ashworth Transfer Inc. and Salt Lake Transfer 
Company who are specialized heavy haulers hold-
ing statewide authority in Utah, other specialized 
haulers such as household goods carriers and bulk 
petroleum carriers are authorized to serve the 
area intrastate." (R. 103) (Emphasis Added) 
This authority issued to Ringsby Truck Lines was 
subsequently transferred to appellant and is contained 
in part C of its present certificate. 
On September 22, 1958, the Commission, in Case 
No. 4656, issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 1288 to appellant, Uintah Freightways, pursuant to 
a joint petition by Ringsby and appellant. The authority 
thus issued to appellant is that previously held by Ringsby 
and is the authority which it contends authorizes it to 
transport petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk. 
The authority reads now as it did in 1938: "to operate 
as a common carrier of property handling both freight 
and express in intrastate commerce . . . " (R. 110) 
(Emphasis Added) 
We think it important to briefly set out the history 
of the authorities of respondents Clark Tank Lines Com-
pany, hereinafter referred to as "Clark" and Pacific 
Intermountain Express Co., hereinafter referred to as 
"P.I.E.". 
On July 31, 1956, P.I.E. acquired the authority pre-
viously held by Collett Tank Lines which authorizes it 
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to transport petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, 
in tank trucks and trailers over irregular routes between 
all points and places in the state of Utah. (R. 114) This 
statewide authority was obtained by Collett Tank Lines 
in 1953. (R. 121) Collett Tank Lines first began trans-
porting petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, in 
the state of Utah in 1941. (R. 132) 
Clark obtained its authority to transport petroleum 
and petroleum products, in bulk, between all points and 
places in the state of Utah in 1953 at the same time 
Collett Tank Lines obtained identical authority. (R. 139) 
Clark began transporting petroleum and petroleum pro-
ducts, in bulk, in the state of Utah by acquiring the 
authority previously held by Paul J. Cox which was 
issued in August, 1943 .. (R. 145) 
Neither appellant or any of its predecessors appeared 
in opposition to any of the applications, proceedings or 
hearings by which respondents Clark and P.I.E., or their 
predecessors, acquired their specialized authority for 
handling bulk petroleum and petroleum products. 
(R. 66) 
On pages 5 and 6 of its brief, appellant states that 
Uintah Freight Lines and its predecessor, Sterling Trans-
portation Company, handled transportation of liquid 
petroleum products, in bulk, and cites as authority there-
for, Exhibit 2. Such is not the case. Exhibit 2 clearly 
shows that the only bulk transportation performed was 
in the years 1938 and 1939, in an unidentified amount, 
by Sterling Transportation Company. This fact was 
properly noted by the Commission in its order. (R. 196-
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197) Sterling Transportation hauled no bulk petroleum 
at any other time. Uintah Freight Lines never hauled any 
bulk petroleum. Ringsby has never hauled any bulk 
petroleum, nor has appellant hauled any bulk petroleum 
at any time. 
Appellant has never owned any equipment suitable 
for the transportation of bulk petroleum products (R. 24) 
nor has it ever had a tariff on file which would allow 
such transportation. (R. 26) 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
APPELLANT'S CERTIFICATE IS SUBJECT TO 
INTERPRETATION BY THE COMMISSION 
The Commission properly stated the issue in its Find-
ings of Fact: 
"The sole question for determination is the 
interpretation to be given to said certificate No. 
1288." (R. 196) 
We do not question the authorities and the prior 
opinions of this Court to the general effect that if a 
certificate is clear and unambiguous and if there is no 
uncertainty therein, there is no basis for interpretation. 
Appellant quotes from the case of Salt Lake Transfer 
Company vs. Barton Truck Lines, Inc. (1959), 8 Utah 
2d 401, 335 P. 2d 829. However, it does not continue 
with the pertinent portions of the quotation. This Court 
held in that case: 
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"We do not gainsay the correctness of the rule 
set forth in Peterson v. Public Service Commission, 
relied upon by Plaintiffs; that the extent of the 
carrier's authority is to be found from the terms 
of the certificate. We there said that it is not 
permissible, 'to go back of the language and con-
trdict its plain terms * * *.' However, that is only 
one side of the coin. The other is that when the 
language is reasonably susceptible of different in-
terpretations it can only be properly understood 
in the light of existing circumstances and the pur-
pose behind it. We are unable to see any particular 
merit in plaintiffs' contention, but if there be any, 
this case is a good example of the necessity of 
looking to the background and character of the 
grant to determine the rights existing thereunder. 
*** 
"The order made finds further support in the 
doctrine of administrative interpretation: that 
where the grant is open to doubt or uncertainty, 
some weight is to be given to the interpretation 
and application the commission has made. Further 
implementing this conclusion is the fact that the 
plaintiffs themselves have heretofore conformed 
their operations with the Commission's interpreta-
tion, ... " 
That each case must be determined upon its own 
merits is clearly set forth in the language of this Court 
in Milne Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Public Service Commission 
of Utah ( 1962), 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P. 2d 590. That 
case is absolutely controlling in this situation. In that 
case this Court sustained an order of the Public Service 
Commission holding that the authority of Milne author-
izing it to transport "commodities generally" did not 
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include the authority to transport petroleum and petrol-
eum products in bulk. In that case as in this case, there 
had been no holding out by the carrier, no tariff pub-
lished, and no equipment available for such transporta-
tation. The Court stated: 
"In the instant case there is evidence that 
neither the Public Service Commission nor the 
carriers operating in this area have ever assumed 
that the term 'commodities generally' included 
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in tank 
vehicles.'' 
Appellant contends that it is authorized to transport 
"property handling both freight and express" and urges 
that the term property is broader than the term general 
commodities or commodities generally as construed in 
the Milne case. Under appellant's theory if "property'' 
is a part of the commodity description and is all inclusive 
and broader than the term "general commodities," there 
would be no need to add the phrase "handling both 
freight and express." 
Actually the word "property" is not a part of the 
commodity description in appellant's certificate and is 
not used to describe the scope of the authority granted 
but is merely the term used by the Commission to denote 
whether or not the authority relates to the transportation 
of "property" or "passengers." This is evident by the form 
used by the Commission for applications for Certificates 
of Public Convenience and Necessity (Form No. A-27). 
In the caption of that form, there is a space for insertion 
of either the term "passengers" or "property", and there 
are subsequent provisions for the commodity description. 
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In other words, the appellant's certificate authorizes the 
transportation of "property" as opposed to "passengers", 
and the descriptive portion of the commodity description 
is "freight and express." The term "express" has been 
consistently defined by the Utah Commission and by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission as involving an ex-
pedited type of service not provided by general com-
modity carriers, usually at an increased rate and normally 
relating to small shipments of limited weight. 
In the recent case of Railway Express Agency, In-
corporated, Extension - Nashua, MC 66562 (Sub No. 
1515), 15 F.C.C. 35, 508, 91 M.C.C. 311, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission stated: 
"Later, in Trasportation Activities of Arrow-
head Freight Lines ( 11 Federal Carriers Cases 
33,239), 63 M.C.C. 5 73, and in Mistletoe Exp. 
Service Extension - Texas (9 Federal Carriers 
Cases 32,793), 61 M.C.C. 737, 747, it was em·~ 
phasized that the term 'general commodities mov-
ing in express service' includes a bona fide holding 
out, together with the ability to transport any 
commodity which may be safely transported in 
ordinary van-type equipment, including those re-
quiring a maximum degree of care or security or 
both; but that it does not include the transpor-
tation of liquid commodities in tank vehicles, ... " 
(Emphasis Added) 
See also Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Ex-
tension, MC 66562 (Sub No. 217), 3 F.C.C. 30,064, 31 
M.C.C. 363, Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Ex-
tension, MC 66562 (Sub No. 194), 3 F.C.C. 30,359, 
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31 M.C .. C. 603 and Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., No. 
MC C-1052, 9 F.C.C. 32, 615, 61 M.C.C. 131. 
Thus if appellant is to prevail, it must be on the 
proposition that the single term "freight" authorizes the 
transportation of bulk petroleum products notwithstand-
ing a previous history that none of the carriers in the 
state of Utah, including appellant, nor the Commission 
has ever given it such a construction. 
We think it must be conceded that the term "freight" 
means something less than the term "general commodi-
ties" as that term was construed in the Milne case. The 
Utah Legislature has so treated it. In the definition of 
the term "automobile corporation" in Section 54-2-1 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the statute refers to persons, 
corporations, and others engaged in the business of trans-
porting "freight, merchandise, or other property." Para-
graph ( 14) of the same section defines the term "common 
carrier" by distinguishing between "freight, refrigerator, 
oil, stock, and fruit car corporations engaged in the trans-
portation of property." Furthermore, if the term "freight" 
was all inclusive, as urged by appellant, there would be 
no necessity for the additional authority to handle "ex-
press." The Legislature has again clearly indicated that 
it considers the terms "freight and express" to be less 
than all inclusive. In Section 59-15-4 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, creating a sales tax on transportation, the 
Legislature levied a tax "for all transportation ... pro-
vided, that said tax shall not apply to intrastate move-
ments of freight and express." (Emphasis Added) Thus 
it is not subject to question that appellant's position in 
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this case is much weaker than was Milne's position in 
the case above referred to. 
In the Milne case, this Court also stated: 
"The distinction made in these reports between 
'general freight' and 'liquid petroleum products' 
would seem to indicate that the terms 'general 
commodities' and 'general freight' are not under-
stood to include petroleum products in bulk." 
(Emphasis Added) 
Appellant states in its brief in several instances that 
it has protested all applications for authority to transport 
petroleum products, in bulk, since it was certificated in 
1958 and adds as an aside that no such applications have 
been filed. To claim any benefit from such a statement 
is, in our opinion, nonsensical. The fact of the matter is 
that the record clearly shows that neither appellant nor 
any of its predecessors appeared in protest to any of the 
applications or hearings of any of the carriers possessing 
the specialized authority to transport petroleum and 
petroleum products, in bulk. ( R. 66) Appellant wants 
to take credit for the fact that no bulk petroleum appli-
cations have been filed since its certification in 1958 
and wants to ignore the failure of its predecessors to 
appear in protest to the applications of respondents and 
their predecessors, and paradoxically it wants to take 
credit for the fact that one of its predecessors (Sterling 
Transportation Company) did haul some unknown 
quantity of bulk petroleum in 1938 and 1939. We submit 
that appellant can gain no comfort from such inconsistent 
positions. 
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This Court in the Milne case, supra, indicated that 
the failure to protest such applications by a general freight 
or general commodity carrier was of considerable im-
portance. The Court stated: 
"When a carrier which has not previously 
transported petroleum products in bulk applies to 
the Commission for authority to do so, almost in-
variably, the carriers already possessing such 
authority submit a formal protest to the Commis-
sion. Even though there is no evidence that Milne 
or any other general commodity carrier has ever 
protested the granting of such authority, Milne 
contends that it has always had authority to trans-
port petroleum products in tank vehicles. 
"There is no indication in the record that 
Milne or any other general commodity carrier has 
ever held itself out to the public as a carrier of 
petroleum products; nor is there any indication 
that they ever assumed they had authority to do 
so. On the other hand, as has been pointed out, 
there is evidence that both the Commission and 
the carriers have made a distinction between 
general freight and petroleum products in bulk 
transported in tank vehicles." (Emphasis Added) 
Appellant, in its Statement of Facts, makes the state-
ment that it has actively solicited any and all traffic avail-
able, including bulk petroleum products, since it received 
its authority in 1958, and again repeats this contention 
in its Argument on page 10 of its brief. The Commission 
found to the contrary. Its finding is fully supported by 
the evidence. 
It is undisputed that the appellant has never owned 
any equipment suitable for bulk petroleum transportation 
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and it has never had a tariff on file permitting such 
transportation. Section 54-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, makes it unlawful for a carrier to perform trans-
portation without an appropriate tariff on file. 
We respectfully direct the attention of the Court to 
the testimony of Witness Smith, the traffic manager of 
appellant, and Witness Grua, its president and general 
manager. On direct examination, Witness Smith testified 
directly and specifically that he personally had solicited 
bulk petroleum transportation. (R. 16, 17) However, on 
cross-examination, he reluctantly admitted that he had 
not. (R. 23) 
Mr. Grua testified generally concerning the solicita-
tion of bulk petroleum products which consisted of a 
vague reference to a single contact with Standard Oil 
Company in 1961 in which he stated that the solicitation 
included all of the products manufactured by Standard 
Oil Company but that they did not get far enough in 
the conversation to discuss the availability of equipment 
or the lack of a tariff. (R. 60) The other so-called 
solicitation consisted of contacts with his personal friend, 
Mr. Sowards, who has an interest in H. S. Sowards & 
Sons, a company domiciled in Vernal, Utah, which itself 
transports petroleum products as a commission agent for 
Continental Oil Co. Continental Oil Co., not H. S. 
Sowards & Sons, pays the freight and has the authority 
to give the business to a soliciting carrier. Mr. Sowards 
admitted on cross-examination that he had no authority 
to award this business to appellant or anyone else. (R. 46) 
Certainly common sense dictates that if Grua were 
serious in soliciting bulk petroleum business from Con-
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tinental Oil, he would have made his contact directly 
with that company which pays the freight, selects the 
carrier, and has the authority to award the business, and 
not with his friend in V emal who was unable to give the 
business to him had he wanted to. 
We cannot believe that appellant is serious in its 
contention that it has ever actually solicited bulk petrol-
eum business and held itself out for such transportation. 
We think the record clearly shows that it has not and 
that no carrier can hold itself out to perform a transpor-
tation service for which it has no equipment available 
and no tariff on file. Certainly the evidence clearly sup-
ports the Commission's finding that it has not held itself 
out for such transportation. 
The Commission's interpretation is further borne out 
by an examination of the history of bulk petroleum trans-
portation in the state of Utah. At the time Sterling 
Transportation Company was issued its authority, there 
was no outstanding authority for petroleum products, in 
bulk. This specialized authority was issued to respondents 
and other carriers in similar situations during the war 
emergency in 1941 and 194 2. The meticulous care taken 
by the Commission in determining what bulk petroleum 
authority should be issued is evidenced by Commissioner 
Hacking's dissent in 1947 in Case No. 2894 granting 
Clark Tank Lines Co. additional authority. He stated: 
"I dissent. I do not believe that the record 
supports the application for additional operating 
authority in the State of Utah for the transporta-
tion of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk 
in tank-truck and tank-trailer. The record shows 
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that during the early days of the recent war rail-
road tank cars being used in the transportation of 
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk were 
withdrawn from service in this area suddenly 
placing a very heavy burden on tank-truck trans-
porters. It further appears that during the follow-
ing years until cessation of hostilities, there was an 
increased distribution of gasoline occasioned by war 
installations which was noticeably reduced after 
the war and railroad tank cars are back in service 
in this area. 
The record further shows that since October 
14, 1936, R. A. Gould has served as a contract 
carrier of petroleum products in bulk in the State 
of Utah, and that since November 19, 1941, Owen 
M. Collett has been authorized and has served 
the shippers of the State of Utah for the trans-
portation of petroleum and petroleum products. 
Under press of war emergency, contract carrier 
permits #138 and#290 in the name of R. A. 
Gould were cancelled, and a temporary certificate 
of convenience and necessity # 634 was issued on 
April 29, 1944. On the 15th day of July, 1943, 
contract carrier permits #274 and #285 issued 
to Owen M. Collett were cancelled, and tem-
porary certificate of convenience and necessity 
#616 was issued. Each of the above mentioned 
carriers and particularly Owen M. Collett has 
greatly increased the amount of equipment oper-
ated since the beginning of the war. 
It further appears that said existing contract 
carriers subsequently operating as common car-
riers of petroleum products in bulk at the time 
of the taking of the testimony in this case, were 
financially able, and had sufficient equipment to 
handle all of the petroleum and petroleum pro-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
ducts in bulk reasonably anticipated to be shipped 
in intrastate commerce in Utah by motor vehicle. 
Before any additional permanent operating auth-
ority, arising out of the war emergency is granted, 
R. A. Gould and Owen M. Collett should be given 
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate whether 
or not they can adequately meet the service re-
quirements following post war adjustments and 
there should be convincing evidence that these two 
carriers are unable or unwilling to meet the reason-
able demands that might be made of them. I do 
not believe any such showing has been made in 
this record. 
After careful examination of the evidence, I 
find that there is no showing of convenience and 
necessity for applicant's service as described in 
his application, and therefore, the application 
should be denied." (R. 142B, 142C) 
It is apparent that neither appellant's predecessors 
nor the Commission considered such predecessors or other 
general commodity carriers as being in the bulk trans-
portation business. This again points up the importance 
of their failure to appear and protest such applications. 
If they were, in fact, holding themselves out for such 
transportation and claiming authority to perform it, their 
failure to make such facts known, must work as an estop-
pel at this late date. 
Appellant argues that inasmuch as there is an exclu-
sion in part C of its authority relating to bulk petroleum 
products the omission of such exclusion in the portion 
under consideration is of importance. There might be 
some substance to this contention if the different portions 
of appellant's authority had been issued at the same time. 
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However, part C was issued to Ringsby Truck Lines in 
1957, and the restriction against the transportation of 
bulk petroleum products was voluntarily placed upon the 
authority by the Commission even though the certificated 
bulk petroleum carriers did not protest the application. 
( R. 103) Their failure to so protest is further evidence 
that they did not consider general commodity carriers or 
general freight carriers as even asserting a right to trans-
port bulk petroleum products. 
Appellant cites the case of Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. 
et al vs. Charlton Bros. Transportation Company, Inc. 
( 1948) 48 M.C.C. 289, to the effect that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has interpreted a certificate 
authorizing the transportation of general commodities as 
including authority to transport petroleum products in 
bulk. The Interstate Commerce Commission has, on 
many different occasions, construed the term "general 
commodities" in different ways. When this Court was 
considering the Milne case, supra, the interpretation 
claimed by appellant here was urged upon it, and it was 
referred to the Coastal Tank Lines case, supra. The In-
terstate Commerce Commission's interpretation was re-
jected by this Court. 
Further evidence that neither the parties nor the 
Commission have ever considered appellant's authority 
to authorize the transportation of bulk petroleum pro-
ducts is found in the order of the Commission, dated 
September 22, 1958 in which appellant was issued the 
authority now under consideration. In paragraph 9 of 
that order, the Commission stated: 
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"That Uintah Freightways has filed a schedule of 
equipment that it proposes to use in the conduct 
of the transportation service described in this ap-
plication, which equipment appears to be proper 
and adequate to perform the proposed transporta-
tion service." ( R. 1 09 ) 
That schedule of equipment contained none suitable 
for the transportation of bulk petroleum products. Had 
either appellant or the Commission considered the author-
ity transferred to include bulk petroleum products, such 
a statement would not have been made in the absence 
of such specialized equipment. 
The following quotation from the Milne case, supra, 
is eloquent argument of its applicability to the case at 
hand: 
"This court has repeatedly held that where the 
Commission has acted within the scope of its au-
thority, its order will not be disturbed if it has 
any substantial foundation in the evidence and is 
not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 298; 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128.) In determining 
whether the Commission's order is supported by 
the evidence, this court must consider the factors 
underlying such order. When, as in the case at 
hand, the Commission's order is based upon the 
meaning of a term as it is used in the motor 
carrier industry, the court will take into account 
the special knowledge that the Public Service 
Commission has acquired through its continuo?s 
experience in the motor carrier field. (See Landts, 
Administrative Process, p. 152, 14 Miss.L.J. 321.) 
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Its superior understanding of the carrier industry, 
plus the fact that the legislature has delegated to 
the Commission the power to limit a carrier's 
authority, requires that considerable weight be 
given to its finding. (Utah Freightways, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, 9 Utah 2d 414, 346 
P.2d 1079.) It must be conceded that this court, 
by merely reading the record, cannot be made 
fully aware of the meaning the motor carrier in-
dustry has given to the term, 'commodities gen-
erally.' 
"The reasonableness of the Commission's order 
must be determined in light of the statutory setting 
in which it operates. The Commission is required 
by statute to regulate so as to prevent unnecessary 
duplication of services in areas where the existing 
transportation service adequately meets the needs 
of the public. (54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953.) Where there 
are two possible interpretations of the authority 
contained in a certificate, the interpretation which 
more fully conforms to the statutory purpose 
should be adopted. Recognizing that one purpose 
of this legislation was to prevent unfair and 
destructive service, this court has held that the 
Commission's assent was necessary before a carrier 
could increase its service, even though the scope 
of its service was not expressly limited in the car-
rier's certificate. (Gilmer v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 67 Utah 222, 24 7 P. 284.) The same 
principle is applicable to the case now before us. 
To allow Milne and other general commodity 
carriers to transport petroleum and petroleum 
products in tank vehicles without first determining 
that such service is necessary and in the public 
interest, would not only be contrary to our statu-
tory purpose, but would substantially impede the 
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regula tory function of the Public Service Com-
mission." 
The importance of this case can not be overestimated. 
To allow appellant, under the circumstances here prevail-
ing, to invade the field of bulk petroleum transportation 
would result in chaos, not regulation. It would destroy 
the years of meticulous care given by the Commission in 
controlling the regulation of transportation in this as well 
as all other specialized fields and is obviously contrary to 
the interpretation placed upon the authority by the Com-
mission, the appellant, and all carriers concerned. 
Appellant's certificate is certainly subject to inter-
pretation by the Commission, and that interpretation 
being fully supported by the evidence should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
Point II 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
COMMISSION ARE FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND ARE 
NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS 
Point II and Point III raised in appellant's brief 
merely assert the conclusion that the order of the Com-
mission and its suspension of the tariff were arbitrary, 
capricious, and unconstitutional. Points II and III will 
be treated herein jointly. 
Appellant claims that the evidence is undisputed that 
it has continuously held itself out as ready, willing and 
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Lhle to transport petroleum and petroleum products, in 
mlk, in tank vehicles. With this statement, we disagree. 
rhe Commission is certainly entitled to take into con-
;ideration the candor, or lack thereof, of the witnesses. 
Witness Smith testified on direct that he personally had 
;olicited bulk petroleum transportation. (R. 16, 17) How-
~ver, on cross-examination, he admitted, after some prod-
iing, that he had not. This is what appellant designates 
as "undisputed evidence." The same is true of the testi-
nony of Witness Grua. See the discussion under Point I. 
Appellant's position seems to be that the active solici-
tation of petroleum products, ·in bulk, and a bona fide 
holding out as ready, willing and able to perform such 
transportation service can be satisfied by the mere state 
of mind of the carrier. 
The record is replete with testimony and documentary 
evidence fully supporting the Commission's findings that 
there was no actual holding out, that neither the Com-
mission nor the appellant nor any of the carriers involved 
ever considered the authority in question to include bulk 
petroleum products. There is a complete absence of 
credible evidence of any kind that appellant did hold 
itself out to perform such transportation. Certainly the 
Commission is entitled to consider the fact that the ap-
pellant had no equipment for this transportation and 
had no tariff on file which would permit it to be per-
formed lawfully. The Commission has acted within the 
scope of its authority and there is substantial evidence 
to support its findings and order. See Mulcahy vs. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 298; Union 
Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 102 Utah 
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465, 132 P.2d 128 and Milne Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Public 
Service Commission, supra. 
Point III. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S OFFER OF PROOF CONCERNING 
AUTHORITIES OF CERTAIN CARRIERS 
Appellant made an offer of proof of the authorities 
of certain carriers not parties to this proceeding. The 
Commission properly denied such offer. 
The authorities of other carriers in and of themselves 
would be of no aid whatever to the Commission in in-
terpreting the meaning of appellant's certificate as was 
pointed out by this Court in the Milne case, supra: 
"It is possible that authority to transport 
'commodities generally' has a different meaning 
in one part of the country than it does in another. 
The scope of such authority might also vary from 
carrier to carrier due to different conditions 
existing at the time the certificate was issued." 
(Emphasis Added) 
Respondents herein have spent considerable time out-
lining the history of the certificates of appellant as well 
as those of respondents in order to show the factual back-
ground under which the certificate in question was issued, 
as an aid in determining the intent of the Commission 
at the time of its issuance. Obviously, the naked cer-
tificates of other carriers without a historical background 
to explain or amplify their meaning would be of no value 
in this proceeding. 
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Appellant argues that the certificates offered were 
~eneral in their terms with explicit exclusions as to 
::;ertain commodities and from that concludes that they 
would control the interpretation of its certificate. 
This argument is not convincing. Authorities may be 
issued, for example, to transport "chemicals" excluding 
certain items that may or may not normally be in the 
chemical field. The exclusion may be for the purpose 
of eliminating a protest of a carrier appearing at the 
hearing who contends its authority embraces a chemical 
and the applicant may agree to an amendment excluding 
such commodity without any binding effect whatever 
upon the Commission that the specific commodity is 
or is not a chemical. Furthermore, the fact that exclusions 
appear after a commodity description does not in any 
way indicate that the commodity description itself is 
all inclusive. 
CONCLUSION 
The interpretation placed upon appellant's certificate 
by the Commission is fully supported by the evidence, 
is a reasonable and necessary interpretation in light of 
the history of the transportation of petroleum products, 
in bulk, in this state and the same should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK K. BOYLE 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendants and Respondents 
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. 
and Clark Tank Lines Company 
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